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Abstract 
In the debate about Turkish EU membership and free movement of labour it is often overlooked that the EU 
cannot exercise a zero migration policy even if permanent safeguards were used. Even under the currently 
prevailing strict regime, there is an annual net migration from Turkey to the EU-15 in the order of 35,000 
people. Any slowdown or suspension in Turkey’s accession process is likely to lead lower growth and higher 
unemployment in Turkey. Moreover, the reform process might slow down or be partially reversed. The 
consequence of such a combination would be drastically higher number of potential migrants. A considerable 
proportion of them would be finding their way into the EU – as experience has shown irrespective of legal 
restriction. It is thus possible that if Turkey loses the membership perspective, the EU may end up having 
more immigrants than under a free movement of labour regime with a prosperous EU member Turkey. 
Moreover, the composition of this migration would be less conducive for the EU labour markets - and - for 
integration in the host societies. 
The experiences of Greece, Portugal and Spain indicate that a successful accession period with high growth 
and effective implementation of the reforms reduces and gradually eliminates the migration pressures. There 
is no a priori reason why Turkey would not go through a similar experience.  
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Growth and Immigration Scenarios 
for Turkey and the EU 
EU-Turkey Working Paper No. 13/December 2004 
Refik Erzan, Umut Kuzubas and Nilufer Yildiz 
he purpose of this study is to estimate the eventual immigration from Turkey to the EU when 
Turkey becomes a full member and restrictions on labour mobility are removed. Alternative 
methods and scenarios are scrutinized in forecasting probable magnitudes for the period 2004 
to 2030. The analyses are essentially based on the experience of countries that joined the EU. The 
estimation methods are those used in recent studies that analyze the membership consequences of the 
Central and East European countries. Special attention was paid to the experience of the southern 
“cohesion” countries - Greece, Portugal and Spain. Finally, forecasts were also made based primarily 
on the Turkish emigration record. 
Occasionally, sensational news articles on the scary magnitude of potential migrants from Turkey take 
the headlines in EU media. Careless interpretation of casual opinion polls can put the number up to 
25% of a population of about 70 million. Magnitudes that emerge from serious research work are a 
fraction of that. The survey of this literature undertaken by the 2004 “Impact Study” (Issues Arising 
from Turkey’s Membership Perspective) of the EU Commission has reported that forecasts of 
immigration from Turkey to the EU-15 until 2030 range between 0.5 and 4.4 million, assuming free 
mobility of labour in about a dozen years from now. The Impact Study also underlines that to arrive at 
the higher end estimates (about 4 million), the studies have to torture the data and the methodology. 
As a result of the literature survey that we have undertaken in the framework of this study and our 
contacts with the relevant research centres in the EU (see the references), we have not come across any 
net migration forecasts from Turkey to the EU that exceeds the probable magnitudes reported in the 
Impact Study. 
Analytical studies follow two alternative methods in making immigration forecasts. The first one is 
statistical inferences based on scientifically designed surveys. The second one is econometric methods. 
The latter draws on the pre and post EU membership experiences of emigration countries. Quantifiable 
determinants of immigration – pull and push factors – are identified and their joint impact on 
immigration is estimated. These estimates are then used to forecast eventual migration from “to be” 
members.  
Our simulation results for net migration from Turkey to EU-15 in the period 2004-30 is between 1 and 
2.1 million, foreseeing a successful accession period with high growth and free labour mobility 
starting 2015 – a rather optimistic assumption to explore the upper bound of the immigration potential. 
On the other hand, if Turkey’s membership process is endangered and high growth cannot be 
sustained, 2.7 million people may be penetrating the EU-15 despite the prevailing strict restrictions on 
labour mobility. 
Reference Group: 1967-2001 Immigration from All Europe 
At the first stage of analysis, we followed the method used in the EU Commission report by Brücker, 
Alvarez-Plata and Siliverstovs (2003) in estimating potential migration from Central and Eastern 
Europe. Using an econometric model, the study estimates migrant stocks in Germany originating from 
19 source countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Holland, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Turkey, UK, and (former) 
Yugoslavia). Germany was chosen as the host country because of the size of the migrant communities 
in this country and the availability of robust time series data dating back to 1967. 
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We used the specification that yielded the best overall result in the EU Commission study.
1 As 
explanatory variables; income level in the country of origin (wht) captures the cost of migration, 
employment rates (eft),(eht), the probability of finding jobs, and, income differences between the 
home and host countries (wft/wht), the material return to migration. To these, the lagged migrant 
stocks (mfh,t-1 ),(mfh,t-2 ) were added to measure the impact of “networking” among immigrants. 
Introduction of free labour mobility in EU members was captured by the FREE dummy variable while 
GUEST denoted the 1967-1973 period when “guest worker” agreements were operational. To correct 
for the jumps in immigration due to refugees and asylum seekers, WAR in (former) Yugoslavia and 
INTERVENTION (1980 military) and INSURGENCY (1990-94 terror) in Turkey were used. Table 1 
gives the estimation results for the 1967-2001 period indicating the coefficients of the explanatory 
factors and their significance levels.
2 
It was observed that all the estimated coefficients were significant and the overall explanatory power 
of the model (the fit) was very high. However, the small values of the coefficients indicated that 
income and employment rate differences did not have powerful effects in determining inter-European 
migration during the period under consideration.
3 
Table 1. Regression results – “All Europe” sample, 1967-2001 
Independent Variables  Coefficients  S.E  P-value 
M(-1)  1.23 0.019  0.000 
M(-2) -0.37  0.018  0.000 
Ln(Wf/Wh)  0.05 0.006  0.000 
Ln(Wh)  0.07 0.006  0.000 
Ln(ef)  0.34 0.033  0.000 
Ln(eh)  -0.10 0.008 0.000 
FREE 0.01  0.001  0.000 
GUEST 0.11  0.003  0.000 
INTERVENTION 0.15  0.033  0.000 
INSURGENCY 0.10  0.019  0.000 
Adjusted R
2 = 0.99     
 
                                                 
1   mfht = αh + β1mfh,t-1 + β2mfh,t-2 + β3 ln(wft/wht) + β4 ln(wht) + β5ln(eft) + β6 ln(eht) + ufht 
mfht:    The share of migrants from country h residing in country f (Germany) as a percent of home 
population 
w:   Wage (income, proxied by GDP-PPP per capita) 
e:   Employment rate (1-unemployment rate) 
h, f, t:  Home, foreign country and year, respectively. 
Population data from World Development Indicators (2003), migrant stock data from the Federal German 
Statistical Office, per capita GDP from Maddison (2002) and Groningen Growth and Development Center, 
employment rates, from OECD Economic Outlook. 
2 The model is estimated using SUR. This method was chosen because of its superior performance with large 
databases in the EU Commission study. Common slopes were assumed for all countries but intercepts were 
allowed to be country specific.  
3 As the estimation is semi-logarithmic, a coefficient with an absolute value of 1 implies that a change in this 
variable would affect the dependent variable at the same rate of change. Values smaller than 1 imply smaller 
impacts. GROWTH AND IMMIGRATION SCENARIOS: TURKEY-EU | 3 
 
Migration Forecasts for Turkey: 2004-30 
The coefficients obtained from the estimations for migration into Germany from the “all Europe” 
sample of 19 source countries (including Turkey) for the 1967-2001 period were used to make 
simulations for emigration from Turkey. Following similar studies, German per capita GDP was 
assumed to grow 2% annually and the employment rate stay at the 1991-2001 average level. Income 
and employment projections for Turkey were adopted from our ongoing study scrutinizing alternative 
growth scenarios for Turkey, analysing demographic developments, urban and rural growth and 
productivity, internal migration (urbanisation) and unemployment.
4 The main scenario used here 
foresees a successful EU accession with sustained high growth and gradually declining unemployment 
(Table 2). UN population projections were adopted in all computations. 
Table 2. High growth scenario for Turkey, 2005-2030 (annual values)) 
Urban GDP Growth     0.065 
Urban Productivity Growth     0.03 
Rural GDP Growth   0.02 
Unemployment – 2015  Urban 
Average 
0.13 
0.09 
Unemployment – 2030  Urban 
Average 
0.05 
0.04 
 
Under these assumptions, projections were made for immigration from Turkey to Germany.
5 
According to latest available data covering the EU-15 area, Germany hosted 76 % of all immigrants in 
the EU originating from Turkey.
6 Using this share as a benchmark, immigration estimates for 
Germany were inflated to represent the total for the EU-15 area.
7  
Two scenarios were simulated with these parameters. Both assumed that restrictions on labour 
mobility would be largely abolished in 2015. This rather optimistic assumption was adopted to arrive 
at an upper bound for immigration numbers.  
The first simulation emulates for Turkey the actual experience of EU countries with free movement of 
labour (using the FREE dummy). This involves a considerable integration of these economies during 
the accession periods. 
The second simulation emulates - repeats - for Turkey the experience of these countries (including 
Turkey) with guest worker agreements until 1973 (using the GUEST dummy). The purpose of 
simulating this inferior scenario is, again, to explore an upper bound for the migration potential. 
                                                 
4 See, “Growth, Employment and Active Policies”, Bogazici University, June 2004, www.cee.boun.edu.tr. 
5 The iterations include the decline in unemployment in Turkey (about 1 percentage point) resulting from 
migration to the EU. 
6 The migrant stock data used in the simulations do not cover those who were naturalized in Germany. Data on 
naturalization of EU citizens were not available for Germany. Therefore naturalized immigrants could not be 
included in the estimations covering all European source countries. Data on naturalized immigrants originating 
from Turkey were available. This factor could be incorporated in forecasts based solely on the Turkish 
experience - reported further on in this study. Although naturalization entailed considerable numbers in the last 
decade, it did not affect the immigration projections significantly.  
7 This assumes that all other EU-15 countries that host immigrants have the same “pull” effects as Germany.  4 | ERZAN, KUZUBAS & YILDIZ 
 
Figure 1. Simulation of Free Movement of Labour 
 
 
Figure 2. Simulation of Guest Worker Scenario 
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Table 3. Comparison of the two scenarios – Reference group: All Europe 
Net Change in the Turkish 
Migrant Stock 
2004-2015 2015-2030  Total 
Scenario FREE   460.000 613.000  1.073.000 
Scenario GUEST  564.000 1.274.000  1.838.000 
      
Turkish Migrant Stock  2004  2015  2030 
Scenario FREE  2.675.000 3.140.000  3.750.000 
Scenario GUEST  2.700.000 3.250.000  4.500.000 
 
When the actual membership cum free labour mobility experience of the EU countries - an experience 
that Turkey has yet to live through - was taken as the benchmark, immigration forecasts from Turkey 
exhibited a rather smooth curve (Figure 1). The small hike of 2015 transformed into a declining flow. 
Total net migration barely reached 1.1 million by 2030 (Table3). 
Instead of relying on the actual experience of the EU members with free labour mobility, when we 
emulated (and repeated) the guest worker episodes for Turkey in 2015, we observed a jump in 
migration, reaching moderate levels around 2020 (figure 2). Even under this inferior scenario, the total 
immigration projection to EU-15 from Turkey until 2030 was not drastic, about 1.8 million (Table 3). 
This inferior scenario depicts an accession process not properly utilized for structural adjustment and 
integration. 
The authentic free movement of labour scenario (the first scenario) incorporated the socioeconomic 
improvements in the accession countries. These improvements relieved the migration pressures. 
Restrictions on labour became much less binding, hence, as they were removed, there was no major 
rush. 
It should be emphasized that socioeconomic improvements were not simply higher incomes and more 
jobs. Otherwise the coefficients for these basic economic variables would have been much larger in 
the estimations. The improvements in accession countries covered dimensions such as social security, 
health, education and regional disparities. 
Reference Group: 1967-2001 Spain, Portugal and Greece 
We have verified the methodological accuracy of our estimations reported above (Tables 1 and 3) by 
comparing them with the findings of research conducted for the EU Commission on Central and 
Eastern Europe. We have also exchanged notes with these researchers at the October 2004 Istanbul 
conference where this paper was originally presented. Nevertheless, to test for sensitivity of sample 
selection, we repeated our parameter estimations by excluding rich countries such as Austria and 
Denmark. We confined our sample to the southern “cohesion” countries - Greece, Portugal and Spain 
(and Turkey) - that had characteristics resembling Turkey at the time of their accession. 
Figure 3 depicts the immigration episodes from these countries and Turkey to Germany. To adjust for 
differences in country sizes, the net immigration figures were given as percentage of their respective 
populations. There were major flows from all these countries during the guest worker agreements. As 
restrictions on labour mobility were lifted, the decreasing Spanish migrant stock continued its 
tendency. In Greece and Portugal there was a modest hike in the number of migrants but it 
smoothened shortly after. In the more recent years, the stock was declining, indicating reverse net 
migration.  6 | ERZAN, KUZUBAS & YILDIZ 
 
Figure 3. Migrants in Germany as % of Source Country Population 
Note: The apparent decline in the Turkish migrant stock stemmed from naturalization. Number of migrants from 
Turkey who were naturalized in Germany was less than a thousand per year until 1984. 1984-1990 this 
annual figure reached 2 thousand. There was a steep climb during the 1990s. For 1990-2003, the annual 
figures were, respectively, 2, 4, 7, 13, 20, 32, 46, 42, 60, 104, 83, 77, 65, 56 (000). 
Migration Forecasts for Turkey Based on Southern Europe: 2004-2030 
Estimates for the “determinants” of migration were obtained using similar specification as with “all 
Europe” for the period 1967-2001. Using these parameters, again the two simulation exercises were 
repeated – the FREE and GUEST scenarios. In both simulations, Turkey was assumed to be on its 
baseline high growth path (Table 2). 2015 was retained as the regime switching date. Computations 
for Germany were adjusted for EU-15 in the same way as in the previous exercises. 
Figure 4. Simulation of Free Movement of Labour 
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Figure 5. Simulation of Guest Worker Scenario 
 
Table 4. Comparison of the two scenarios – Reference group: Southern Europe 
Net Change in the Turkish 
Migrant Stock 
2004-2015 2015-2030  Total 
Scenario FREE  320.000 640.000  960.000 
Scenario GUEST  440.000 1.480.000  1.920.000 
      
Turkish Migrant Stock  2004 2015  2030 
Scenario FREE  2.755.000 3.075.000  3.715.000 
Scenario GUEST  2.755.000 3.195.000  4.677.000 
 
The picture that emerged (Figure 4) closely resembled that with “all Europe” sample. When the free 
labour mobility experience of Greece, Portugal and Spain was emulated for Turkey, a small hike 
occurred in migration that stabilized promptly at a low level. In this scenario, total net migration 
forecast until 2030 was not exceeding 1 million (Table 4). 
The experiment using the Southern Europe sample but mimicking the guest worker syndrome led to a 
major jump that normalized in due course (Figure 5). The total net migration estimate approached 2 
million, doubling the previous forecast based on the actual membership experience of these countries. 
Nevertheless, even this inflated figure was considerably below sensational projections.  
Turkey’s Own Experience 1967-2001 as the Only Reference 
How to inflate further the migration forecasts? “Turkey is not any other South European Country”, 
“unlike Greece, Portugal and Spain, Turkey has a nomadic tradition”. If these prejudices are taken for 
granted, Turkey’s own experience would be the only benchmark. 
Migrant Stocks (in millions) and Net Change in Migrant Stock (in thousands)
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The model was estimated for the period 1967-2001 for immigration from only Turkey to Germany. 
The coefficients of the explanatory variables denoting income and employment differences were again 
significant. So were the INTERVENTION and INSURGENCY dummies. The absolute values of the 
income and employment parameters were considerably greater than those obtained in estimations with 
the “all Europe” and “Southern Europe” samples. This was expected since Turkey has not had yet the 
socioeconomic transition that the current EU members have accomplished during their accession 
periods.  
Using the parameters obtained from these estimations, migration projections were made for the 2004-
2030 period, and they were adjusted upward for EU-15. Obviously, these parameter estimates and 
projections, unlike the previous ones, did not contain any information on actual EU membership or 
free labour mobility experience. The only labour mobility Turkey had in accordance with an 
agreement was the guest worker episode of the 1960s until 1973.  
High Growth, EU Membership and Free Movement of Labour: Forecast 2004-2030  
In our first simulation with the Turkish record as the only benchmark, we retained our baseline high 
growth scenario as depicted in Table 2. Following a successful accession period, Turkey becomes a 
EU member and free labour mobility is introduced in 2015. Given that Turkey’s only experience with 
a labour arrangement was the guest worker episode, free movement of labour could only be introduced 
in the forecast as the repetition of this experience. 
The resulting projection exhibited a major jump in migration that moderated gradually (Figure 6). The 
forecast for total net migration until 2030 reached 2.1 millions. This somewhat exceeded the higher 
scenario based on the South European experience (Table 5).  
Figure 6. EU Membership Emulating the Turkish Guest Worker Episode 
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Figure 7. No Membership and No Free Movement of Labour 
 
Table 5. Comparison of the two scenarios – Reference: Only the Turkish experience 
Net Change in the Turkish Migrant 
Stock 
2004-2015 2015-2030  Total 
High Growth – Membership – Free 
Movement of Labour 
246.000 1.888.000  2.134.000 
Lower Growth - No Membership – 
No Free Movement of Labour 
760.000 1.974.000  2.734.000 
     
Turkish Migrant Stock  2004 2015 2030 
High Growth – Membership – Free 
Movement of Labour 
2.499.000 2.745.000 4.633.000 
Lower Growth - No Membership – 
No Free Movement of Labour 
2.506.000 3.267.000 5.241.000 
 
Suspended EU Accession, Lower Growth and No Free Mobility of Labour: Forecast 
2004-2030 
Our last simulation depicts a scenario where Turkey’s EU accession is suspended. High growth cannot 
be sustained and unemployment climbs. More specifically, the urban GDP grows at 4 % annually with 
1.5 % productivity increase and rural GDP stagnates. Unemployment approaches to 20 %.
8  
In this scenario, the prevailing EU visa regulations are retained. This obviously curtails major jumps in 
migration. However, the slow pace in income growth and the deterioration in the labour market 
increase migration pressures considerably. An increasing number of the potential migrants penetrate 
the EU (Figure 7). The forecast for total net migration until 2030 in this scenario exceeded 2.7 million. 
                                                 
8 In this lower growth scenario, average (urban + rural) unemployment reaches 17% in 2015 and 22% in 2030. 
Migration to the EU reduces these figures to 16% and 19%, respectively. 
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The result is a warning that if the membership perspective is lost, EU may end up having more 
immigrants from Turkey despite strict restrictions on labour mobility. This paradoxical scenario is 
indeed realistic for three reasons. 
Firstly, Turkey’s growth record clearly shows very high rates can be achieved but cannot be sustained 
without political stability and inflow of foreign savings. Without the EU anchor provided by the 
membership perspective, a growth performance that will cope with unemployment is not feasible. 
Secondly, unlike successful accession scenarios, not only growth in Turkey would be slower and 
unemployment higher, but also sensitivity of migration to income and unemployment differences 
would be greater.
9  
Thirdly, the prevailing restrictive visa system of the EU and the absence of labour mobility provisions 
cannot stop immigration. EU currently receives about 70,000 (gross) migrants from Turkey, annually. 
(Because of return migration, net migration is about half of this gross inflow figure.
10) Most of them 
come with family unification and family formation. In the presence of a very large Turkish migrant 
community in the EU of about 3 million (with major trade, investment, tourism and educational links), 
all conceivable tight door policies short of totalitarian rules would be porous. A relative deterioration 
in Turkey would certainly increase this inflow considerably and reduce return migration. 
Finally, it should be noted that the eventuality of political turmoil was not incorporated in the 
projections. With the lost EU perspective and climbing unemployment, this is more than a slim 
possibility. Estimations based on past record show that political and security problems lead to waves 
of migration.
11 Add that on top of the 2.7 million forecast! 
Impact of the Aging of Turkish Population on Migration 
In the current study, as the estimations were based on past population structures, the impact of the 
changes in the age composition of Turkish population was not specifically taken into consideration.
12 
However, the propensity to migrate differs among age groups considerably and the very young 
Turkish population is bound to age. 
A regional survey conducted in Turkey by Hacettepe University, Ankara, jointly with the Netherlands 
Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) and Eurostat (2000) revealed that the migration 
tendency of people aged 55 and above was extremely low.
13 Hubert Krieger’s (2004) study based on 
Eurobarometer surveys corroborated these results. Turkish population is aging. According to the UN 
projections, the share of people aged 55 and above in Turkey will nearly double by 2030 (Figure 8). 
When this demographic development was crudely incorporated in our projections, it was found that 
total migration forecasts until 2030 had to be scaled down by about 300,000. 
                                                 
9 Coefficients for income and employment differences have considerably higher values in the estimations with 
the “Turkish experience only” compared with that of the “all Europe” and “South European” samples. The 
reason is lesser convergence of the Turkish socioeconomic system.  
10 We have crosschecked stock and flow data (OECD, SOPEMI) for current Turkish migrant inflow to EU-15. 
Due to missing data, we do not have exact figures. We infer that the gross inflow can be 60,000 to 90,000 and 
the gross outflow 30,000 to 40,000.  
11 As reported in the first section of the study, in the estimations covering 1967-2001, dummy variables 
INTERVENTION (1980) and INSURGENCY (1990-94) were highly significant and improved the fit 
considerably. 
12 The estimations based on 1967-2001 data do implicitly incorporate the aging experienced in the sample 
countries. However, the projections implicitly assume the same average population structure as in the past. 
13 The regional coverage of this study was not representative for Turkey as a whole. Therefore, the age 
configuration of propensity to migrate was not formally incorporated in our projections. GROWTH AND IMMIGRATION SCENARIOS: TURKEY-EU | 11 
 
Figure 8. Share of Age Groups in Total Population 
 
 
Conclusion 
As Turkey becomes an EU member and enjoys free movement of labour, the net inflow of migrants 
will most likely be in the direction to the EU-15 in the foreseeable future. The projections for potential 
Turkish migration based on the experiences of various groups of countries differed. However, the 
magnitudes involved were by no means sensational, despite the fact that we wishfully assumed that 
free movement of labour would be introduced as early as 2015.  
It should be emphasized that the EU cannot exercise a zero migration policy. Even under the currently 
prevailing strict regime, there is an annual net migration from Turkey to the EU-15 in the order of 
35,000 people. What should be scared of are the consequences of a slowdown or suspension in 
Turkey’s accession process. The economic impact of such an eventuality is lower growth and climbing 
unemployment in Turkey. The political impact would be a slowdown or reversal of the reform 
process. The outcome of the two would yield a drastically higher number of potential migrants. A 
considerable proportion of them would be finding their way into the EU. If Turkey loses the 
membership perspective, the EU may end up having more immigrants than a free movement of labour 
regime with Turkey. And the composition of this migration would be less conducive for the EU labour 
markets - and - for integration in the host societies. 
The experiences of Greece, Portugal and Spain indicate that a successful accession period with high 
growth and effective implementation of the reforms reduces and gradually eliminates the migration 
pressures. There is no a priori reason why Turkey would not go through a similar experience.  
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Table 6. Summary: migration forecasts From Turkey to EU-15 
Reference Group: “All Europe” 
High Growth – Membership – Free 
Movement of Labour 
2004-2015 2015-2030  Total 
Scenario FREE  460.000 613.000  1.073.000 
Scenario GUEST  564.000 1.274.000  1.838.000 
 
Reference Group: Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey 
High Growth – Membership – Free 
Movement of Labour 
2004-2015 2015-2030  Total 
Scenario FREE  320.000 640.000 960.000 
Scenario GUEST  440.000 1.480.000  1.920.000 
 
Reference Group: Only the Turkish Experience 
  2004-2015 2015-2030  Total 
High Growth – Membership – Free 
Movement of Labour 
246.000 1.888.000  2.134.000 
LOWER Growth  
NO Membership  
NO Free Movement of Labour 
760.000 1.974.000  2.734.000 
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